Democracy, Consultation, And The Paneling Of Disputes Under GATT

Overview: States have long sought to have their conflicts adjudicated by institutions. Often dismissed as a quasi-judicial system held together by countless loopholes, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement has nonetheless enjoyed marked success. Indeed, against all expectations, this institution has not only resolved an impressive number and variety of trade conflicts, but has helped anchor an increasingly “rules-based” global economy. Few would disagree that the ad hoc tribunals are important; the fact is that most cases are never brought before a panel. Instead, the majority of cases are either withdrawn or resolved in consultations, an informal and required first stage in the GATT disputes settlement process. The decision to “panel” a case is thus an escalatory step that needs to be explained, one that raises questions about the design and efficacy of dispute settlement institutions more generally. This paper takes up these questions, examining why some cases end in consultations, why others go to a panel, and how escalation shapes the prospects for resolving trade disputes at GATT.

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Format: PDF | Size: 110KB | Date: Jan 2003 | Pages: 35