Corporate Governance And Home Bias
- Topics:
- Investor Relations
- Tags:
- Business Operations,
- Corporate Governance,
- Corporate Law,
- Finance,
- Financial Accounting,
- Portfolio
- Source:
- Fisher College of Business
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Overview: In most countries, large shareholders control many of the largest corporations. The article shows that under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holding of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium. It constructs an estimate of the work portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders. This available portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio in regressions explaining the portfolio weighs of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a significant coefficient, but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when one control for country characteristics
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Format: PDF | Size: 216KB | Date: Nov 2001 | Pages: 35



