Monitoring, Moral Hazard, and Market Power: A Model of Bank Lending
- Topics:
- Credit Management
- Tags:
- Bank,
- Financial Services,
- Monitoring
- Source:
- The Federal Reserve Board
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Overview: This paper suggests, that relationship between market power and both loan interest rates and bank risk without placing strong restrictions on the moral hazard problems between borrowers and banks and between banks and a government guarantor, hinge on intuitive parameterizations of the overlapping moral hazard problems. The findings in the paper provide explanation for the dramatic rise and subsequent decline in bank failure rates during the 1980s and 1990s.
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Format: PDF | Size: 236KB | Date: Jan 1999 | Pages: 28
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