Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Deposit Insurance Reform, Funding Manager Decisions and Bond Market Liquidity
- Topics:
- Insurance
- Source:
- The Federal Reserve Board
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Overview: This paper demonstrates that the risk sensitivity of a banking organization's subordinated debt yield spreads may understate the potential for market discipline in some periods and overstate in others because such spreads contain liquidity premiums that are driven, in part, by the risk-sensitivity of funding manager decisions. In addition, it is argued that mandating the regular issuance of subordinated debt would, by reducing the endogeneity of liquidity premiums, improve the information content of both primary and secondary market debt spreads, thereby augmenting both direct and indirect market discipline.
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Format: PDF | Size: 678KB | Date: Jan 2002 | Pages: 36



