Stabilizing Markets Via A Novel Auction Based Pricing Mechanism For Short-Term Contracts For Network Services
- Topics:
- Negotiations and Contracts
- Tags:
- Auction,
- Network,
- Network Service,
- Pricing Strategy
- Source:
- Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
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Overview: This paper studies pricing mechanisms for short-term contracts for network services in a recurring auction with sealed bids. This paper proposes and evaluates a novel winner selection policy in such an auction. The new approach was motivated by an observation that in a recurring auction enough customers must be willing to participate in future auction rounds to prevent collapse of prices. Using simulations, the proposed mechanism is compared with traditional ones. The results demonstrate that the new method increases revenues of the network service provider, minimizes loss of fairness, and enlarges the active customer base of a recurring auction.
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Format: PDF | Size: 464KB | Date: May 2005 | Pages: 14
