A Fully-Rational Liquidity-Based Theory Of IPO Underpricing And Underperformance
- Topics:
- IPO
- Tags:
- Finance,
- Financial Planning,
- Financial Services,
- Investment,
- Investor,
- IPO,
- Theory
- Source:
- Federal Reserve Board
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Overview: The author presents a fully-rational symmetric-information model of an IPO (Initial Public Offering), and a dynamic imperfectly competitive model of trading in the IPO aftermarket. The model helps to explain IPO underpricing, underperformance, and why share allocations favor large institutional investors. In the model, underwriters need to sell a fixed number of shares at the IPO or in the aftermarket. To maximize revenue and avoid selling into the aftermarket where they can be exploited by large investors, underwriters distort share allocations towards investors with market power, and set the IPO offer price below the aftermarket trading price. Large investors who receive IPO share allocations sell them slowly afterwards to reduce their trade's price-impact.
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Format: PDF | Size: 505KB | Date: Feb 2006 | Pages: 69
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