A Sequential Search Model For IPO Pricing And Contracting
- Topics:
- IPO
- Tags:
- Finance,
- Financial Planning,
- Financial Services,
- Investment,
- IPO
- Source:
- City University of New York
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Overview: With a sequential search model, this paper examines a firm's incentive to underprice its IPO (Initial Public Offering) in order to deter a representative investor's interest for its rival firm's IPO. There is a cross-firm information spillover during the investor's sequential search: the search for the first IPO will reduce the cost of searching the next IPO. With the search sequence random, each issuer does not know who will take this information spillover advantage, itself or its rival.
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Format: PDF | Size: 700KB | Date: Aug 2006 | Pages: 74
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