Economics And Politics Of Alternative Institutional Reforms
- Topics:
- Organization
- Tags:
- Deregulation,
- Entrepreneurship,
- Entry,
- Government,
- London School Of Economics,
- Management,
- Regulations
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Overview: This paper compares the economic consequences and political feasibility of reforms aimed at reducing barriers to entry (deregulation) and improving contractual enforcement (legal reform). Deregulation fosters entry, thereby increasing the number of firms (entrepreneurship) and the average quality of management (meritocracy). Legal reform also reduces financial constraints on entry, but in addition it facilitates transfers of control of incumbent firms, from untalented to talented managers. Since when incumbent firms are better run entry by new firms is less profitable, in general equilibrium legal reform may improve meritocracy at the expense of entrepreneurship.
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Format: PDF | Size: 564KB | Date: Jan 2007 | Pages: 51







