Electricity Generation With Looped Transmission Networks: Bidding To An ISO
- Topics:
- Electricity Transmission
- Tags:
- ISO,
- Network,
- Retail,
- Retail Company,
- University Of Wisconsin
- Source:
- University of Wisconsin
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Overview: This paper uses a bilevel game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks. It analyzes the effectiveness of an Independent System Operator (ISO) when generators (and, in some cases, retailers) have market power. Generators (respectively retailers) bid a single parameter of their quadratic supply (demand) functions to the ISO, which taking these bids at face value, maximizes welfare subject to transmission constraints. Our numerical results suggest that transmission limits can have important impacts on market efficiency and the delivery of consumer welfare, but that market power may not significantly reduce economic efficiency.
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Format: PDF | Size: 239KB | Date: Jun 2004 | Pages: 30



