Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis
- Topics:
- Insurance
- Tags:
- Benefits,
- Software,
- Insurance,
- Human Resources,
- Healthcare,
- Health Insurance,
- Health Care,
- Hazard,
- Enterprise Software,
- Corporate Insurance,
- ...
- Source:
- University of Minnesota
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Overview: Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. The authors empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. Using a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy the authors find significant evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection.
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Format: PDF | Size: 1,382KB | Date: Aug 2006 | Pages: 57



