Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis

Topics:
Insurance
Tags:
Benefits,
Software,
Insurance,
Human Resources,
Healthcare,
Health Insurance,
Health Care,
Hazard,
Enterprise Software,
Corporate Insurance,
...
Source:
University of Minnesota

FREE Registration is required

Vendor Registration: $ Paid Download

Overview: Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. The authors empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. Using a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy the authors find significant evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection.

(Is this item miscategorized? Does it need more tags? Let us know.)

Format: PDF | Size: 1,382KB | Date: Aug 2006 | Pages: 57


advertisement
advertisement
  • Click Here
  • Click Here
  • Click Here
advertisement

Returning users: Log In Here!

Already registered on BNET, TechRepublic, or ZDNet? Simply log in.

Free Membership: Sign Up Now!

Sign up for a free membership today and get instant and unlimited access to one of the largest databases of white papers, webcasts, and casestudies anywhere. Your FREE membership allows you to:

  • Download an unlimited amount of content, including classic and current white papers, case studies, webcasts and more
  • Track content on your chosen topics of interest
  • Receive targeted email alerts when your favorite content is added
  • Save content for future reading
  • Receive our member newsletter

When you register to access this directory, you become a member of BNET. In addition, you allow us to share your information with companies that produce products or services featured in the library--so that such companies may contact you with information and offers regarding their products and services. This enables us to keep the library a free service. As a directory registrant, you will receive a complimentary subscription to the BNET member newsletter, The BNET Report. You can unsubscribe from this newsletter at any time. By clicking the Sign up button, you indicate that you agree to our Terms and Conditions and have read and understand our Privacy Policy (updated).