Interests, Information, and the Domestic Politics of International Agreements
- Topics:
- Budgeting,
- Commercial Lending,
- World Bank
- Tags:
- Adjustment,
- Agreement,
- Compliance,
- Preference
- Source:
- Stanford University
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Overview: This paper examines how citizens form preferences about compliance with international agreements. The paper argues that compliance creates domestic winners and losers through two channels, adjustment and reputation. It then shows that the preferences of citizens vary systematically with their exposure to the adjustment costs and reputation benefits of compliance. The relationship between personal interests and policy preferences holds mainly for the most informed portion of the electorate, though, whereas the preferences of less knowledgeable citizens are harder to reconcile with self-interest. This finding has potentially broad implications for models of policy choice.
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Format: PDF | Size: 260KB | Date: Jul 2004 | Pages: 36
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