Carrots and Sticks: The Threat of Dismissal and Incentive Compensation
- Tags:
- Benefits,
- Human Resources,
- Incentive,
- Incentive Based Compensation,
- Pay-for-performance,
- Sales,
- Sales Force Management
- Source:
- University of Texas
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Overview: This paper analyzes the role of two incentive devices in managerial compensation: the threat of termination and pay for performance. This paper constructs a model predicting that these devices are substitutes; when the termination incentives are low, optimal contracts provide stronger pay-for performance incentives. This paper also test the model's prediction by comparing the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managers who perform similar tasks in very different organizational forms: CEOs of real estate investment trusts (REITs) and general partners of real estate limited partnerships.
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Format: PDF | Size: 948KB | Date: Jun 2004 | Pages: 41



