Trade Disputes and the Implementation of Protection Under the GATT: An Empirical Assessment

Topics:
GATT,
Tariffs,
WTO
Tags:
GATT,
Protection
Source:
Brandeis University

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Overview: This paper is a first attempt to empirically determine why countries choose to violate or adhere to GATT rules when making trade policy adjustments between negotiating rounds. One uses a previously unexploited set of data in which countries implemented two 'Types' of protection under the GATT system between 1973-1994: 'Legal' protection in which countries utilized the GATT's safeguards provisions, and 'Illegal' protection in which the protection was provided outside of the safeguards provisions, resulting in a formal trade dispute. This paper finds substantial evidence that concerns for retaliation affect government policy decisions in ways which contribute to the explanation of the existence of trade disputes.

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Format: PDF | Size: 608KB | Date: Jun 2002 | Pages: 36


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