Agency Theory and the Design of Efficient Governance Mechanisms

Topics:
Incentives and Compensation
Tags:
Agency,
Board,
Business Operations,
Corporate Governance,
Corporate Law,
Ratification,
University Of Toronto
Source:
University of Toronto

FREE Registration is required

Overview: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the mechanisms by which corporate boards may fail to provide the monitoring and ratification of managerial decision in public and private corporations. The paper creates a framework for thinking about the problem of designing efficient governance mechanisms that is based on the theory of agency. Mechanisms by which boards can fail to provide efficient governance of the firm via monitoring and ratification of managerial decisions are analyzed, and the framework is used to supply structural and behavioral interventions designed to make board's better agents for the shareholders.

(Is this item miscategorized? Does it need more tags? Let us know.)

Format: PDF | Size: 187KB | Date: Feb 2001 | Pages: 57

People who downloaded this item also downloaded

Case Study Lower Costs, Greater Transparency, and Regulatory Compliance Through a Hosted Solution From SAP
White Paper Integrating Entrepreneurship and Strategic Management Activities to Gain Wealth: CEOs' Perspectives
Webcast Real Life Examples: Performance Management and Capacity Planning
White Paper Providing a Long-Term 'Map' for Organizational Effectiveness
White Paper Fundamentals Of Organization Structure

Top results from Incentives and Compensation

White Paper Building Reliable IP Telephony Systems
White Paper Oracle Accelerate - Not Just Smart but Timely
White Paper Forrester - Competition Intensifies For the SMB ERP Customer
White Paper Optimizing Sales Messaging: The Impact of What You Say on Sales Performace
White Paper The Value-Driven Paradigm

» View all Incentives and Compensation listings

advertisement
advertisement
  • Click Here
  • Click Here
  • Click Here
advertisement

Returning users: Log In Here!

Already registered on BNET, TechRepublic, or ZDNet? Simply log in.

Free Membership: Sign Up Now!

Sign up for a free membership today and get instant and unlimited access to one of the largest databases of white papers, webcasts, and casestudies anywhere. Your FREE membership allows you to:

  • Download an unlimited amount of content, including classic and current white papers, case studies, webcasts and more
  • Track content on your chosen topics of interest
  • Receive targeted email alerts when your favorite content is added
  • Save content for future reading
  • Receive our member newsletter

When you register to access this directory, you become a member of BNET. In addition, you allow us to share your information with companies that produce products or services featured in the library--so that such companies may contact you with information and offers regarding their products and services. This enables us to keep the library a free service. As a directory registrant, you will receive a complimentary subscription to the BNET member newsletter, The BNET Report. You can unsubscribe from this newsletter at any time. By clicking the Sign up button, you indicate that you agree to our Terms and Conditions and have read and understand our Privacy Policy (updated).