Sales force Compensation: Revisiting and Extending the Agency-Theoretic Approach
- Tags:
- Benefits,
- Compensation,
- Human Resources,
- Sales,
- Sales Force,
- Sales Force Management,
- St. Louis
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Overview: Since the papers of Basu et. al. and Lal and Srinivasan, marketing academics have been interested in the design and implementation of optimal compensation plans. The literature has focused on agency theory as a foundation to help describe and understand this process. Although there has been much theoretical work on this topic, empirical evidence to support this theory remains sparse. Studies by Coughlan and Narasimhan and John and Weitz have found some early evidence that supports agency theory. This paper revisits the issue of salesforce compensation on both theoretical and empirical fronts.
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Format: PDF | Size: 308KB | Date: Nov 2004 | Pages: 44
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