Competition and Price Discrimination in the Market for Mailing Lists
- Topics:
- Price Optimization,
- Pricing Strategy
- Source:
- Federal Reserve Board
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Overview: This paper examines the relationship between competition and price discrimination in the market for mailing lists. More specifically, the paper examines whether sellers are more likely to segregate consumers by offering a menu of quality choices (second-degree price discrimination) and/or offering different prices to readily identifiable groups of consumers (third-degree price discrimination) in more competitive markets. It also examines how the fineness with which consumers are divided corresponds to the level of competition in the market. The results indicate that lists facing more competition are more likely to implement second-degree and third-degree price discrimination, and when implementing second-degree price discrimination, to offer menus with more choices.
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Format: PDF | Size: 275KB | Date: Oct 2005 | Pages: 34
