The Market for Intellectual Property: The Case of Complementary Oligopoly
- Topics:
- Music
- Tags:
- Business Operations,
- George Mason University,
- Intellectual Property,
- Marketing,
- Marketing Research,
- Oligopoly,
- Pricing,
- Research & Development
- Source:
- George Mason University
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Overview: This paper applies a model of complementary oligopoly and anticommons pricing to the market for intellectual property rights. The model evidences the interesting and often overlooked result that, in the market for complementary goods price coordination and monopolistic pricing do not necessarily represent inefficient equilibria, when compared to the alternative Nash equilibrium. Due to the peculiar cross-price effects in the supply of complementary goods, price coordination and monopolistic supply often constitute an improvement over the alternative equilibrium outcomes.
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Format: PDF | Size: 180KB | Date: May 2002 | Pages: 30
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