Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying
- Topics:
- Music
- Source:
- University of London
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Overview: The effects of piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model. When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, the paper highlights the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. It investigates the strategic pricing game by focusing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria.
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Format: PDF | Size: 452KB | Date: Apr 2002 | Pages: 40
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