Implications For The Compensation Structure And Risk-Taking Incentives Of CEOs
- Topics:
- Sarbanes Oxley Compliance
- Tags:
- Business Operations,
- Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
- Sarbanes-Oxley,
- Sales Force Management,
- Sales,
- Research & Development,
- Regulatory Compliance,
- Regulations,
- Policies And Procedures,
- Incentive Based Compensation,
- ...
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Overview: This paper investigates the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the compensation structure and the risk-taking incentives of CEOs, as revealed by their research and development expenses and capital expenditures. It hypothesizes that firms will respond to the additional liability imposed by SOX on corporate executives by altering the mix of incentive compensation and fixed salary awarded to them in order to provide insurance. Consistent with this claim, it finds that there was a significant decline in the ratio of incentive compensation to salary after the passage of SOX.
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Format: PDF | Size: 191KB | Date: Jul 2004 | Pages: 34





