Collective Bargaining Under Complete Information
- Topics:
- Collective Bargaining
- Tags:
- Collective Bargaining,
- Entrepreneur,
- Entrepreneurship,
- Human Resources,
- Labor Relations,
- Management,
- University Of Minnesota
- Source:
- University of Minnesota
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Overview: This paper builds and structurally estimates a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches the collective bargaining environment better than the one provided by private information models. The specification of the model with players having different discount factors allows us to measure their relative bargaining power, a recurrent question in the theory of bargaining. It finds that both entrepreneurs and workers have high discount factors, and no evidence that entrepreneurs have bigger bargaining power as usually assumed.
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Format: PDF | Size: 261KB | Date: Jul 2000 | Pages: 33
