A Quantitative Analysis of Tax Competition V. Tax Coordination Under Perfect Capital Mobility

Topics:
Taxes
Tags:
Finance,
Financial Planning,
Free Trade,
Mobility,
Quantitative Analysis,
Taxes
Source:
National Bureau of Economic Research

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Overview: Theory predicts that strategically-determined tax rates induce negative externalities across countries in relative prices, the wealth distribution and tax revenue. This paper studies the interaction of these externalities in a dynamic, general equilibrium environment and its effects on quantitative outcomes of tax competition in one-shot games over capital income taxes between two governments that set time-invariant taxes and issue debt. Strategic payoffs correspond to welfare gains net of the cost of transitional dynamics in a standard neoclassical two-country model with exogenous balanced growth.

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Format: PDF | Size: 384KB | Date: May 2003 | Pages: 42


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